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While published linguistic judgments sometimes differ from the judgments found in large-scale
formal experiments with naive participants, there is not a consensus as to how often these errors
occur nor as to how often formal experiments should be used in syntax and semantics research. In
this article, we first present the results of a large-scale replication of the Sprouse et al. 2013 study
on 100 English contrasts randomly sampled from Linguistic Inquiry 2001–2010 and tested in both
a forced-choice experiment and an acceptability rating experiment. Like Sprouse, Schütze, and
Almeida, we find that the effect sizes of published linguistic acceptability judgments are not
uniformly large or consistent but rather form a continuum from very large effects to small or non-
existent effects. We then use this data as a prior in a Bayesian framework to propose a small n ac-
ceptability paradigm for linguistic acceptability judgments (SNAP Judgments). This proposal
makes it easier and cheaper to obtain meaningful quantitative data in syntax and semantics re-
search. Specifically, for a contrast of linguistic interest for which a researcher is confident that sen-
tence A is better than sentence B, we recommend that the researcher should obtain judgments from
at least five unique participants, using at least five unique sentences of each type. If all participants
in the sample agree that sentence A is better than sentence B, then the researcher can be confident
that the result of a full forced-choice experiment would likely be 75% or more agreement in favor
of sentence A (with a mean of 93%). We test this proposal by sampling from the existing data and
find that it gives reliable performance.*
Keywords: syntax, semantics, linguistic acceptability, quantitative linguistics
1. Introduction. Historically, the method in syntax and semantics research was for
the researcher to use his or her own intuitions about the acceptability of phrases and
sentences. This informal method worked when the field was developing and the con-
trasts were large, as in 1, but as the field progressed, the contrasts needed for deciding
among competing theories became more complex, and the judgments consequently be-
came more subtle, as in 2.
(1) Chomsky 1957
a. Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.
b. Furiously sleep ideas green colorless.
(2) Chomsky 1986
a. What do you wonder who saw?
b. I wonder what who saw.
Since the early days of generative grammar, researchers have been asking questions
about methods in linguistics research, specifically, the relationship between grammati-
cality and acceptability (Chomsky 1986, Labov 1978, Levelt et al. 1977, McCawley
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1982), the reliability of intuition as a method (Labov 1978, Levelt et al. 1977), and the
practice of linguists using their own intuitions as opposed to consulting naive speakers
(e.g. Birdsong 1989, Householder 1965, Spencer 1973). For a more detailed history of
these issues, see Schütze 1996. In recent years, increases in the availability of data have
led to further discussions of the weaknesses of the informal method (e.g. Arppe &
Järvikivi 2007, Cowart 1997, Featherston 2005, Gibson & Fedorenko 2010, 2013, Gib-
son et al. 2013, Gross & Culbertson 2011, Lau et al. 2017, Linzen & Oseki 2015, Schütze
1996, Sorace & Keller 2005, Wasow & Arnold 2005). Such weaknesses include poten-
tial cognitive biases on the part of the researcher and participants, difficulty in control-
ling for discourse context, the inability to find interactions among factors, and the
inability to find probabilistic effects or relative effect sizes. Furthermore, for readers who
do not natively speak the language that is being described, it is difficult to evaluate the
size of informally reported contrasts. For this reason, an advantage of formal methods is
that they provide fellow researchers with quantitative information about the quality of the
data gathered: quantitative details enable an understanding of which comparisons sup-
port a theory and which do not.
Below, we address several remaining arguments against the widespread adoption of
quantitative methods in syntax and semantics research. We then present a formal repli-
cation of a large-scale experiment by Sprouse, Schütze, and Almeida (2013; henceforth
SS&A) on a set of sentences sampled from Linguistic Inquiry 2001–2010. Using these
data from 100 pairwise comparisons randomly sampled from the same set of articles in-
vestigated by SS&A, we present a novel proposal and provide empirical support for
a small n acceptability paradigm for linguistic judgments (SNAP Judgments),
which is robust to noise and which should dramatically decrease the burden on lan-
guage researchers.
First, we briefly discuss the following arguments in favor of quantitative methods in
syntax and semantics research.
(i) The current error rate in informal linguistic judgments is not as low as it
could be. SS&A accept that there may be published judgments that would not be found
in large-scale experiments, but they note that it is important to know the rate at which
such examples occur. Consequently, SS&A experimentally analyzed 148 randomly
sampled English acceptability judgments from Linguistic Inquiry (LI ) 2001–2010. Of
these 148 experiments, 127 (86%) resulted in significant effects in the predicted direc-
tion using magnitude estimation; 130 (88%) resulted in significant predicted effects
using Likert ratings; and 140 (95%) resulted in significant predicted effects in a forced-
choice experiment (all values here are obtained using mixed models, which are most
appropriate for this type of data; Barr et al. 2013, Bates et al. 2014). Seven of the 148
experiments (5%) did not show predicted effects in any of the three experiments. SS&A
generalize from the 95% rate that informal acceptability intuitions reported in research
articles on generative syntax have statistical properties similar to those of quantitative
experiments that compare acceptability ratings for various experimental items given by
naive participants, because each allows an error rate of approximately 5%. That is, be-
cause a 5% error rate is the acceptable standard in cognitive psychology experiments,
this error rate should also be acceptable in linguistic judgments. SS&A (p. 230) write:
‘The field of experimental psychology has, by consensus, signaled a willingness to tol-
erate a divergence of 5% over the long run between the decision to classify differences
as statistically significant and whether there is a real difference between the conditions’,
and while they do not unqualifiedly endorse 5% as an acceptable error rate, they find it
to be a ‘reasonable starting point for the current discussion’.
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Following Gibson, Piantadosi, and Fedorenko (2013), we believe that the current error
rate in published linguistic judgments could be lower without ‘crippl[ing] linguistic in-
vestigation’ (Culicover & Jackendoff 2010:234). Much of the recent debate on quanti-
tative methods in syntax and semantics has focused on whether a significant p-value
(p < 0.05) has been obtained through a quantitative experiment (see Sprouse & Almeida
2012 for more discussion of effect size and statistical power in linguistic acceptability
judgments). If the null hypothesis can be rejected, the syntactic judgment is said to ‘repli-
cate’. While SS&A do not make a strong claim as to the appropriate role of null hypoth-
esis significance testing (NHST) in syntax and semantics judgments, we believe that
there is a place for understanding the significance of judgments in formal experiments.
But we do not believe that the standards developed in the NHST paradigm are unprob-
lematically applicable to linguistic judgments.
On the one hand, a p < 0.05 false-positive threshold for NHST in behavioral ex-
periments is not comparable to a 5% false-positive rate in published acceptability
judgments. The NHST paradigm assumes that one has performed statistical signifi-
cance testing for each particular effect under consideration; the p < 0.05 threshold is an
easy way to classify the results of these tests, but it does not substitute for the important
quantitative information gathered about each individual effect and the assumption that
the particular sample being studied is drawn from a larger pool. On the other hand, a 5%
error rate in linguistic acceptability judgments suggests that 5% of all judgments would
diverge from the results of a formal experiment. But there is no sampling being done;
the method provides no quantitative information about any individual effect. Therefore
the notion of a statistical threshold across a body of judgments is problematic. If the av-
erage linguistics paper has thirty-three examples (the average number of US English
examples found in the articles examined by SS&A), divergences are uniformly distrib-
uted, and if the divergence rate is 5%, then every paper is likely to contain a question-
able judgment: 1.64 on average.
(ii) Only formal experiments can give detailed information on the size of effects.
In the case of acceptability judgments, it is rarely the case that researchers actually care
whether a sentence is some infinitesimally tiny amount better than another one. In fact,
given a large enough sample size, one is likely to be able to find a statistically signifi-
cant difference between any two sentence types that minimally differ. It is far more in-
formative to investigate the size of the effect. In a rating study, the effect size can be
measured as the difference in mean rating between sentence A and sentence B in terms
of standard deviations. In a forced-choice study, effect size can be estimated by the pro-
portion of participants who choose sentence A over sentence B. Having a standardized
system for obtaining and reporting native-speaker judgments would allow readers to
know just how strong the generalization in question is. That is, when we see two sen-
tences being compared, one with a * and one without, does that mean that 51/100 peo-
ple would prefer the unstarred sentence? 90/100? 100/100? To be sure, we do not think
it is necessary, or even useful, to apply a uniform quantitative threshold for acceptabil-
ity contrasts. Our point is simply that some quantitative information about the size of
the effect is useful for meaningfully interpreting individual acceptability contrasts.
(iii) Informal linguistic experiments make it difficult for researchers who either
are from other fields or do not speak the target language in the materials. Even if
the informal linguistic judgments in journals agreed with results from formal experi-
ments 100% of the time, there are still important reasons for performing formal experi-
ments. Reporting statistically valid inferences about sentence judgments would make
linguistics more accessible to researchers in other fields and to researchers who are un-
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familiar with the language in question. This concern may be especially relevant in light
of recent evidence that reliability on acceptability judgments in non-English languages
may be even lower than those in English (Linzen & Oseki 2015). Formal experiments
using a consistent methodology make it easy to compare effects across languages.
(iv) Formal experiments need not be costly or time consuming since even very
few participants can sometimes give meaningful results. Another common concern
is that formal experiments in syntax and semantics are too costly in terms of time and
money to justify the benefits (Culicover & Jackendoff 2010). Although there is some
cost to doing an experiment, the cost is now relatively low because of the existence of
crowdsourcing platforms like Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk, which can provide ro-
bust results for cognitive behavioral experiments (Crump et al. 2013, Mason & Suri
2012, Sprouse 2011). Such platforms provide cheap, reliable, fast labor, and there is
free software available to perform such experiments (e.g. the Turkolizer software from
Gibson et al. 2011). In a syntactic judgment experiment on Mechanical Turk, the re-
searcher typically posts a survey consisting of a set of sentences (presented either visu-
ally or through audio) and asks for a forced-choice judgment, a rating, or some other
measure of acceptability. Participants fill out these surveys, and the researcher receives
the data—usually within a few hours.
Still, it may seem like overkill to run a large-scale experiment to find out that Rat cat
ate the is a less good English sentence than The cat ate the rat. Moreover, not all re-
searchers have easy access to Mechanical Turk or sufficient funding to run large-scale
experiments. This lack of access to crowdsourcing platforms may especially affect
those outside the United States where Mechanical Turk is less readily available, as well
as those who do fieldwork on less widely spoken languages. As a result, many re-
searchers eschew formal experiments altogether, leading to a gulf between theoretical
syntax methods and experimental syntax methods. Following Myers’s (2009) proposal
of using mini-experiments to formalize and quantify the sort of informal syntactic ex-
ploration that happens anyway, we agree that there is space for a bridge between large-
scale formal experiments and informal judgments. In order to address this issue, we
propose here the SNAP judgments paradigm, which makes obtaining formal linguistic
acceptability ratings easier and cheaper, whether they are performed in the field, in the
lab, or over the internet.
2. Evaluation of judgments from the literature. For our study, we sampled a
new set of sentences from the same 2001–2010 LI issues that SS&A evaluated, and
tested them in a rating experiment and a forced-choice experiment.1
2.1. Ratings experiments.
Participants. A total of 240 workers with US IP addresses were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform. Eleven participants were excluded
from the analysis because they did not self-identify as native speakers of English, leav-
ing 229 participants. An additional five were excluded because they gave numerically
higher ratings, on average, to the hypothesized unacceptable forms than to the hypothe-
sized acceptable forms. These participants were thus probably not doing the task.
Stimuli. PG and an undergraduate assistant went through all of the LI articles from
2001–2010 in which US English contrasts were presented and that were sampled from
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1 SS&A also did a magnitude-estimation study, but since those results were very similar to those of the rat-
ing study, we did not include magnitude estimation here.
by SS&A. We selected only contrasts that (i) were English, (ii) directly compared a
grammatical and an ungrammatical sentence (irrespective of the particular judgment re-
ported, and assuming that OK > ? > ?? > *? > *), and (iii) were not primarily dependent
on interpretation. This resulted in a total of 814 contrasts. Of these, forty-one contrasts
had already been tested by SS&A. From the remaining 773 examples, we randomly
sampled 101 contrasts.
For ninety-six of the contrasts sampled, JH constructed a template illustrating which
properties of sentences other than the syntactic parse were allowed to vary across exper-
imental items and which were not. Next, JH constructed an example item based on the
original contrast reported in the article. Six templates/sample item pairs were assigned to
sixteen MIT undergraduate students in MIT’s 9.59J Laboratory in Psycholinguistics
class (taught by EG; MIT 24.900 Introduction to Linguistics prerequisite). Students were
asked to create ten experimental items (hypothesized grammatical/ungrammatical pairs;
twenty sentences total) for the contrast they were assigned. Student items were hand-
checked and corrected by PG and JH. For each contrast, we tested the ten student items,
the original sentence pair reported in the research article, and JH’s sample item, resulting
in twelve experimental items per contrast. For the five other contrasts in our sample,
eleven items were constructed by JH, which, together with the original sentence pair re-
ported, also resulted in twelve items for those five contrasts.All 1,212 contrast pairs were
divided into four lists of 303 sentences each through a Latin square.
Procedure. Participants were asked to read each of the 606 sentences out loud to
themselves and rate its naturalness on a Likert scale from 1–7. Order of presentation
was randomized for every participant.
Results. After running the experiment, we noticed that twenty-one of our 1,212 sen-
tences had minor spelling mistakes or errors in punctuation. We excluded these twenty-
one sentences from the analysis reported below. These errors were fixed in the subsequent
forced-choice experiment. We also noticed that one contrast was constructed erroneously,
in that it did not represent the intended contrast in its source article. We therefore ex-
cluded this item from the analysis, both here and in the forced-choice experiment.
To eliminate some of the effect of participants using the rating scale differently from
each other, ratings for each participant were z-transformed (mean and standard devia-
tion estimated within participants). For each item in each contrast, we then calculated a
mean z-score and averaged these together to get an overall z-score for the ‘acceptable’
sentence and for the ‘unacceptable’ sentence in each contrast. The effect size is the dif-
ference between these two z-scores.
All 100 contrasts showed a numerical trend in the predicted direction. Following
Sprouse and Almeida (2012), we computed Cohen’s d for each contrast (Cohen 1994).
Cohen’s d is a measure of effect size that is equal to the difference in means between the
two conditions (in this case, the acceptable condition vs. the unacceptable condition),
divided by the standard deviation of the data. Using Cohen’s recommended effect-size
windows, we found 19/100 effects to be small effects (d < 0.5), 15/100 to be medium
effects (0.5 < d < 0.8), and 66/100 to be large effects (d > 0.8). Of the nineteen small-
effect contrasts, seven actually have a Cohen’s d of < 0.2, which is the minimum value
that Cohen posits for a ‘small effect’.
To control for individual variation by participant and item, we fit a linear mixed-
effects model with a sum-coded predictor for hypothesized acceptability (that is,
whether the sentence is reported as ‘acceptable’ or ‘unacceptable’ in the source LI arti-
cle) and random intercepts for both participant and item and random slopes for gram-
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maticality grouped by both participant and item (random effects). The estimated coeffi-
cient for grammaticality is an estimate of the size of the effect, which is in this case the
difference in z-score rating between the ‘acceptable’ variant and the ‘unacceptable’
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Figure 1. Each point is an effect size for the ratings experiment listed on the y-axis with 95% CIs estimated
from the linear mixed-effects model. When the error bars extend through 0, the effect is not significant.
variant, after controlling for participant and item effects. The model also gives us stan-
dard error estimates on this output. Figure 1 plots the effect-size estimates and 95%
confidence intervals estimated from the mixed-effects model. Despite the fact that
many of the articles from which these examples were drawn talk about these contrasts
categorically as either grammatical or ungrammatical, Fig. 1 reveals that the effect sizes
of randomly chosen linguistic judgments do not show any discrete jumps (which one
might expect, given the frequent discussions of ‘grammatical’, ‘marginal’, or ‘ungram-
matical’ sentences) but rather form a continuum from no effect to huge effects.
To assess significance in an NHST framework, we used the linear mixed-effects model
described above, fit using the R statistical programming language (R Core Team 2012)
and the lme4 package (Bates et al. 2014). We performed a χ2 model likelihood-ratio test,
comparing a model with a fixed effect for grammaticality to the intercept model (a model
assuming a single mean for both hypothesized grammatical and hypothesized ungram-
matical sentences), leaving the random-effects structure intact in both models (Agresti
2002, Baayen et al. 2008, Barr et al. 2013). This test asks whether the hypothesized gram-
maticality improves data likelihood significantly given the intercept, given normally dis-
tributed participant and item means, and given normally distributed effect sizes of
grammaticality for every participant and item. In other words, does hypothesized gram-
maticality explain a significant amount of variance in judgments?
To assess the statistical power of this experiment (the likelihood that we correctly de-
tected a true effect), we simulated results using the same number of subjects and items
that were used in the analysis.2 The power analysis showed that, for a true effect size of
0.4, where effect size is the difference between the z-scores of the hypothesized gram-
matical and hypothesized ungrammatical sentences, we have a 96% chance of detecting
a true effect at α = 0.05. Effect sizes at least this big are estimated for 81% of our con-
trasts. For a true effect size of 0.2 (which would be small for experiments like these and
would suggest very little difference between the two sentences), we have a 63% chance
of detecting a true effect. The analysis shows that ninety-two of 100 contrasts in our
random sample show significant effects in the predicted direction (92%). The contrasts
that do not show clear effects in either the rating experiment or the forced-choice ex-
periment (discussed below) are reported in Table 1.
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Table 1. Contrasts that did not show significant effects in the predicted direction in either the rating
experiment or forced-choice experiment. A plus sign means that the contrast showed an effect in the predicted
direction, whereas a minus means that the effect went in the opposite direction from what was predicted.
An asterisk next to the plus or minus means that the effect was significant at p < 0.05.
source article rating forced choice
35.3.Hazout.36–36 + −*
34.4.Lasnik.24a–24b + −*
32.2.Nunes.fn35iia–fn35iib +* −
32.4.Lopez.9c–10c +* −
39.1.Sobin.8b–8f +* −
34.4.Lasnik.22a–22b + −
34.1.Basilico.11a–12a + +
35.3.Hazout.73b–73b + +*
33.1.Fox.47c–48b + +*
33.4.Neeleman.97a–98 + +
34.3.Landau.7c–7c + +*
2 To simulate the random-effects structure, we simulated subjects and items from the unconditional covari-
ance matrix estimated from the mixed-effects model.
Discussion. Of the 100 contrasts, the majority showed the predicted effect robustly.
Of the eight that did not show a significant result in the predicted direction, four showed
clear trends in that direction (35.3.Hazout:73b–73b, 33.1.Fox:47c–48b, 33.4.Neele-
man:97a–98, 34.3.Landau:7c–7c) with estimated effect sizes over 0.1 and ps < 0.15. Four
of the contrasts (35.3.Hazout:36–36, 34.4.Lasnik:24a–24b, 34.1.Basilico:11a–12a, 34.4.
Lasnik:22a–22b) showed only numerical tendencies, with no clear trend in the predicted
direction. We discuss the examples that did not show the predicted effects in more detail
in Appendix D in the online supplementary materials.3 It should not automatically be
concluded that the inclusion of these sentences represents failures on the part of the re-
searchers, although we do believe these experiments suggest that these sentences warrant
further investigation.
2.2. Forced-choice experiments.
Participants. A total of 240 workers with US IP addresses were recruited through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing platform. We excluded participants who
took the test more than once and those who did not self-identify as native speakers of
English. We also excluded participants who chose the hypothesized ‘acceptable’ option
less than 60% of the time. Because most participants chose the ‘acceptable’ option the
vast majority of the time, those who chose it less than 60% of the time were likely not
doing the task. After these exclusions, 201 participants remained.
Stimuli. The stimuli were the same as those in the ratings experiment, except with
minor spelling and punctuation corrections.
Procedure. Participants were asked to read each pair of sentences out loud to them-
selves and choose which sentence sounded more natural. The order of presentation was
randomized across participants.
Results. As in the rating experiment, one contrast was removed due to an error in
how it was constructed, such that it did not represent the intended contrast in its source
article. We found a wide array of effect sizes in the remaining sample of 100 contrasts,
where effect size is taken to be the proportion of trials in which the hypothesized ac-
ceptable sentence is preferred. First, six of 100 contrasts trended in the opposite direc-
tion from that predicted. The remaining 94/100 sentences showed an effect in the
predicted direction. An effect size greater than 0.75 was found for 81/100, and roughly
half (52/100) had an effect size greater than 0.9. Overall, these results demonstrated
smaller effects than those reported by SS&A, but they were qualitatively similar.
To control for individual variation by participant and item, we fit a logistic linear
mixed-effects model predicting whether the participant preferred the hypothesized ac-
ceptable sentence over the hypothesized unacceptable one. We included a fixed-effect
intercept (that is, whether the sentence was reported as acceptable or unacceptable in
the original article) and random intercepts for both participant and item. The estimated
coefficient for the intercept is essentially an estimate of how often a contrast would
show a preference for the hypothesized acceptable form after controlling for participant
and item effects. The model also gives standard errors for the estimates, from which we
can calculate 95% confidence intervals (CIs). Figure 2 plots the effect-size estimates
and 95% CI output from the mixed-effects model.4 As with the rating study, we see no
discrete jumps but rather a continuum of effect sizes.
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3 The online appendices referenced throughout this article can be accessed at http://muse.jhu.edu/article
/628201/pdf.
4 A few of the forced-choice experiments had mean proportions close to 1. Although logistic regressions are
not accurate when proportions are near 1 or 0, this inaccuracy does not matter here, because these effects were
very large.
A small N acceptability paradigm (SNAP) for linguistic acceptability judgments 627
Figure 2. Each point is an effect size for the forced-choice experiment listed on the y-axis with 95% CIs
estimated from the linear mixed-effects model. When the error bars extend through the line at .5, the
effect is not significant. The error bars that appear entirely to the left of the line at .5 are
significant in the opposite direction of what was predicted.
To assess significance in an NHST framework, we used the logistic linear mixed-
effects model described above and used the z-value to calculate a p-value. As
before, we calculated statistical power for several possible true effect sizes. If the un-
derlying effect size was 0.7 (meaning 70% of participants prefer the ‘good’ sentence),
for instance, we would have an 80% chance of detecting a true effect. The results ap-
pear in online Appendix A. Significant trends in favor of the hypothesized acceptable
version were shown in 92/100 contrasts. Two items showed nonsignificant trends in
favor of the hypothesized acceptable version, and four showed nonsignificant trends in
favor of the hypothesized unacceptable version. Finally, two contrasts showed signifi-
cant effects in the opposite direction of the predicted effect.
Discussion. In summary, 89/100 contrasts showed a significant effect in the pre-
dicted direction in both experiments, and 95/100 contrasts showed a significant effect in
the predicted direction in at least one of the two experiments. These results therefore
suggest that, whereas most published linguistic judgments are consistent with the re-
sults found by formal experiments, the methods are critically different.
Our results are quite similar to those reported by SS&A. The contrasts that did not
show significant effects in the expected direction in our experiments are listed in Table
1 above, and we briefly discuss several of these cases in online Appendix D.
3.SNAP judgments.Across our two experimental paradigms, about half of the exam-
ples sampled from LI showed a strong effect (Cohen’s d > 0.8).As many researchers have
pointed out, it seems unnecessary to run a formal experiment in these cases, because they
seem intuitively obvious. But it is not good scientific practice to rely only on intuition since
even strong intuitions are sometimes wrong. To increase efficiency while maintaining sci-
entific rigor, we propose a method for not having to run a large experiment while still being
able to reach a statistically justified conclusion. We call this method a small n accept-
ability paradigm for linguistic judgments (SNAP judgments). We focus on forced-
choice judgments because they are simpler, have greater statistical power, and correspond
more closely to the sorts of binary judgments between two sentences that often appear in
linguistics papers. Of course, not all questions of acceptability are best investigated
through forced-choice judgments, and we leave it to future work to extend this method to
other paradigms.
The basic idea is to be able to draw a statistically valid conclusion based on the data
of just a few participants. To do so, we want to determine how many participants we
would need to consult in order to be reasonably confident that we have a meaningful re-
sult. The simplest way to think about this is to think of each experimental trial as a flip
of a weighted coin, where heads corresponds to a preference for sentence A and tails
corresponds to a preference for sentence B. What we want to know is how often the
coin will come up heads over a large sample of flips—that is, across many trials, how
often sentence A would be picked over sentence B. We want to make inferences about
the underlying parameter p, which is a probability between 0 and 1 that tells us how
often sentence A would be preferred over sentence B. If p is 0.75, this means that 75%
of the time, sentence A would be preferred.
If we ask five people which sentence they prefer and they all prefer sentence A, can
we conclude with certainty that everyone will prefer sentence A? No: it is possible that,
if we ask a sixth person, she will prefer sentence B. We still do not know if the proba-
bility of someone in the larger population preferring sentence A is 90% or 70% or 10%
(in which case getting five people who prefer sentence A was an unlikely—but possi-
ble—accident). We want to try to infer p.
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Here, we estimate p in a Bayesian framework by placing a beta prior distribution
over the effect sizes found in our forced-choice experiment above. In effect, this tech-
nique lets us supplement the results of our experiment by adding in prior information
about what typical linguistic contrasts are like. If we were very confident that most ef-
fect sizes were large, then even after collecting just one data point, we might conclude
that the effect was likely large. If we were very confident that the effect size was near
0.5, we might still think the effect is near 0.5 even if we asked 100 people and they all
said the same thing. To decide how we should set our prior for linguistic judgments, we
empirically estimated the parameters in the beta distribution by fitting the data we ob-
tained in the forced-choice experiment above. We found that the best prior was beta(5.9,
1.1). This means that, for a new contrast where a researcher has used informal methods
to decide that sentence A is clearly better than sentence B, this is roughly equivalent to
an experiment where six participants have said they prefer A and one prefers B. (For a
much more detailed description, see online Appendix E.)
Using the prior, we can ask how many people we need to survey (while getting a
unanimous result) in order to put our estimated effect size over 0.90 and our lower 95%
confidence bound at or above 0.75. We chose this threshold somewhat arbitrarily based
on our perception of what constitutes clear linguistic evidence. But this method can be
used to ask what sample size is needed to achieve some other threshold by using the
data in Table 2 below. Depending on the sort of conclusion a researcher plans to draw,
different levels of effect size and confidence may be warranted.
If we ask three people whether they prefer sentence A or sentence B and they all say
sentence A, the expected mean proportion of people who would pick sentence A is .89
with a 95% CI of [.70, 1]. If we asked five people and they all answered sentence A, the
mean goes to .91 with a 95% CI [.75, 1]. Thus, where n = 5 and the results of the exper-
iment are unanimous, we get an expected mean of .91 and a lower 95% bound of .75.
We believe that this is sufficient to be confident that the result would obtain in a larger
experiment.5 Of course, as the sample size goes up, the experiment will give more in-
formation. Consequently, if a larger sample is easily obtainable, we recommend that.
We do not recommend using fewer than five participants with five unique items for a
SNAP judgment.
3.1. Testing SNAP judgments. We can test the efficacy of the SNAP judgments
proposal in the sample that we already have. First, we ask what the false-positive rate is
for SNAP judgments: how often a SNAP judgment will give a unanimous result when
the underlying experiment is inconclusive. For each experiment, we randomly sampled
five data points, each with a unique participant and a unique item. We then focused on
only the experiments that gave us a unanimous result among the five randomly sampled
data points. We can think of this as a simulated outcome for a SNAP judgment. We re-
peated this procedure 100 times for each of the 100 experiments. On average, fifty-four
of them produced a unanimous result. Of only those trials that produced a unanimous
result, when we looked at the result of the full experiment with all participants and all
items, the mean across those experiments was .92 with a 95% CI of [.76, .99].6 Com-
pare this to our beta prior, which gave us an expected mean of .93 [.75, 1]. The empiri-
A small N acceptability paradigm (SNAP) for linguistic acceptability judgments 629
5 Note that, in a paradigm in which we do not use the prior information obtained from the existing data, we
would have to ask twelve people in order to get a 95% CI of [.75, 1] (using the Wilson score interval for com-
puting binomial CIs).
6 Note that this sampling technique (where we sample unique subjects and items) is not the same as simply
drawing from a binomial with some parameter p for each experiment, due to subject and item effects.
cal test is consistent with the results obtained using the beta prior: the means match ex-
actly, and the lower bound for the 95% CI is also very similar (.75 compared to .76 in
the empirical test). Of the 54% of contrasts that pass SNAP judgments, on average only
0.20% of them show results in the opposite direction of what is predicted, and none of
them included a significant result in the opposite direction.
Next, we ask about the statistical power of SNAP judgments, specifically for large
effects. That is, when an effect is very large, how often does the SNAP judgments para-
digm fail to detect it and thus unnecessarily suggest a full experiment? We define a
large effect here as one where the mean is greater than .90 (roughly half of the experi-
ments in our sample have this property). We simulate experiments as above, drawing on
the real data from the subset of experiments where the mean is above the .90 threshold.
On average, 77% of the experiments with true means above .90 produce unanimous ef-
fects in our simulations using five data points. Despite the small sample size, this is near
the 80% threshold recommended for appropriate statistical power in experiments. Of
course, for smaller effects, the statistical power will be much lower.
One may still, at this point, wonder why we recommend at least five data points for a
SNAP judgment as opposed to any arbitrary number. We believe that n = 5, with a unan-
imous result, provides a robust generalization sufficient for most linguistic judgments.
And crucially, it does not give a significant result in the wrong direction for any of the
samples that we tested from LI. In Table 2, we give means and 95% and 99% CIs for
SNAP judgments that give unanimous results in the predicted direction.
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3.2. Recommendation for SNAP judgments. Given the proposal and evaluation
above, we make the following recommendations for SNAP judgments.
(i) To ensure the applicability of our empirical estimates, SNAP judgments
should only be used when the researcher believes, after informal investigation,
that the effect is clear and likely to be unanimous. If one does not believe that the re-
sults of the survey will be unanimous, it is better to do a large N rating study, which
gives more gradient information, or a forced-choice study, which has more statistical
power (Sprouse & Almeida 2012). From a statistical perspective, it is important that the
researcher has this belief since the recommendations here are based on data that were
published in a journal. Thus, if a researcher only has an inkling that sentence A is better
than sentence B and wants to run a test to be sure, SNAP judgments is not appropriate.
In that case, we recommend a full, larger-scale experiment.
(ii) Construct five unique contrasts (each consisting of sentenceA vs. sentence B,
where one of the two sentences is hypothesized to be more acceptable than the
n mean with 95% CI mean with 99% CI
1/1 0.87 [0.64, 1] 0.87 0[0.5, 1]
2/2 0.88 [0.67, 1] 0.88 [0.55, 1]
3/3 0.89 0[0.7, 1] 0.89 [0.59, 1]
4/4 0.90 [0.73, 1] 0.90 [0.62, 1]
5/5 0.91 [0.75, 1] 0.91 [0.65, 1]
6/6 0.92 [0.77, 1] 0.92 [0.67, 1]
7/7 0.92 [0.78, 1] 0.92 [0.69, 1]
8/8 0.93 0[0.8, 1] 0.93 [0.71, 1]
9/9 0.93 [0.81, 1] 0.93 [0.73, 1]
10/10 0.94 [0.82, 1] 0.94 [0.74, 1]
Table 2. Means with the 95% and 99% CIs where the number of unanimous participants in the experiment
varies from one to ten. For instance, in an experiment with three participants, all of whom choose
unanimously, one can estimate a mean of .89 with a 95% CI of .70 to 1
and a 99% CI of .59 to 1.
other) and make sure that the five contrasts vary in lexical content and whatever
other factors may influence the acceptability of the sentences in question. Present
each contrast to a unique naive participant and ask for a forced-choice judgment.
This could be done using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (paying perhaps five cents for one
judgment, such that the whole experiment will cost less than fifty cents) or by simply
asking for judgments from students, friends, informants, or colleagues who are naive to
the experiment in question.7
Researchers in the field can use the same procedure, and in extreme situations in
which access to speakers is severely limited (as in the case of endangered languages), it
may be necessary to poll fewer than five participants. Table 2 lists the conclusions that
can be drawn from even smaller SNAP judgments. For these extreme cases, we note
that even the use of three independent data points substantially reduces the risk of a
false positive. Thus, these recommendations need not dramatically slow or impede the
pace of fieldwork: fieldworkers often do have three independent data points for a con-
struction or contrast in question and can report those judgments quantitatively.
(iii) If all five naive participants agree with the predicted result, one can con-
clude the following: the predicted mean for the full experiment is .91, with a 95%
CI of [.75, 1] and a 99% CI of [.65, 1]. That is, one can be 95% confident that at least
75% of people would agree with the intuition. See Table 2 for guidelines when using
participant sample sizes other than five.
(iv) If the judgments are not all in agreement, then the intuition that the result
would be unanimous is wrong. This is not a failure of SNAP judgments but one of its
major advantages: giving the opportunity to explore where there is variation among
items. If there is not agreement among participants, look at the five items. Is there a pat-
tern among the items that do not show the expected effect? Do variations in word
choice or prosody or context seem to affect the results? If so, this might be an opportu-
nity to further explore the nature and size of the effect in question. If new hypotheses
are generated by the SNAP judgments experiment, one can then test these hypotheses.
At that point, we recommend a formal experiment with a larger number of items and
participants in order to understand the size of the effect and possible sources of varia-
tion. (Note that, if one were to simply perform SNAP judgments repeatedly on the same
grammatical contrast, one might eventually find a string of unanimous responses just by
chance. This is the multiple comparison fallacy, and, in that case, the statistical guide-
lines here would not be directly applicable.)
3.3. Limitations of SNAP judgments. Although the SNAP judgments paradigm
addresses issues with statistical power in running linguistic experiments, there are a
number of limitations of this technique that are worth considering and that can be ex-
plored in future research. For one, the guidelines presented here do not solve the prob-
lem of how to write good items that generalize to the contrast in question. Even if a
researcher were to test 100 versions of some specific syntactic generalization, he may
have overlooked some special case in which the generalization does not hold due to lex-
ical, pragmatic, or contextual factors. Statistics should supplement, not replace, careful
thought about syntax and semantics.
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7 Note that, for experiments run on Mechanical Turk, there are occasionally participants who click ran-
domly or do not pay attention to the task. As a result, it is good practice to also include questions with known
answers, such as simple comprehension questions about the target sentence. Participants who do not correctly
answer these simple questions can be excluded from the analysis.
Moreover, the SNAP judgments proposal does not address what factors are involved
in distinguishing the acceptability of two structures. In particular, this framework does
not guarantee that any differences are due to syntax (‘grammaticality’) rather than some
other factor that might systematically differ between the two structures, such as world
knowledge (‘plausibility’) or lexical or discourse properties.
When SNAP judgments is used with in-person participants as opposed to over the in-
ternet, we recommend caution in making sure that the researcher does not bias the par-
ticipants toward any particular answer. When done online using a crowdsourcing service
like Mechanical Turk, it is good practice to include some checks to make sure that par-
ticipants are engaged, doing the task, and competent users of the language of interest. For
more on using Mechanical Turk for language research, see Crump et al. 2013, Gibson et
al. 2011, Mason & Suri 2012, and Sprouse 2011.
Another limitation of the paradigm here is that we have so far tested it only for English
sentences sampled from LI. More work is needed to see how well the recommendations
here extend to other languages and other types of sentences that may be of theoretical in-
terest. There is also more work needed in order to know whether LI sentences are typical
of judgments of theoretical interest or whether they differ in meaningful ways from other
peer-reviewed journals and whether journals differ from conference proceedings.
Finally, it is important to note that the judgments we trained on here are published
judgments and thus not necessarily representative of the judgments that linguists are
faced with in day-to-day research. In particular, because the recommendations here are
based on published judgments that the authors presumably believe are correct, the
model assumptions are not valid for questions where a researcher is uncertain. It is pos-
sible that the distribution observed here would be different using unpublished data and
thus that there might be different SNAP judgments recommendations depending on
where in the publication pipeline a particular judgment is.
4. General discussion. In this article, we have replicated the empirical findings of
SS&A. In a sample of 100 contrasts from Linguistic Inquiry, we found a wide range of
effect sizes in both a rating experiment and a forced-choice experiment. Small, medium,
and large effects are all well represented in the data set. Of these syntactic judgments re-
ported in LI, 89% show significant effects in the predicted direction in two types of large-
scale formal experiments. In the remaining 11%, there are varying levels of uncertainty
about the judgments elicited. In all of these cases, we believe that the formal experiments
uncover interesting sources of variation that could illuminate the theoretical questions at
stake and improve the articles in which they appeared.
Moreover, we used the empirical results presented here as a foundation on which to
build a prior distribution of what syntactic judgments can be expected to look like.
Specifically, we found that a beta distribution is a good fit to the distribution of proba-
bilities found in the forced-choice experiment, and we used it to recommend a new par-
adigm for small-sample acceptability experiments.
We believe that the SNAP judgments paradigm will make it easier and cheaper for
language researchers to obtain statistically justified linguistic acceptability judgments.
Specifically, in instances where a researcher is confident that a judgment would pro-
duce a unanimous result across five participants, we recommend a forced-choice exper-
iment with five participants and five items. If the result is unanimous, the results of this
small N experiment can be combined with a beta prior to give a predicted effect size of
.93 with a 95% CI [.75, 1].
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There is great value in being able to attain cheap and easy quantitative data in syntax
and semantics—and in knowing when to run larger experiments. Marantz (2005) (and
more recently Linzen and Oseki (2015)) proposes three distinct classes of acceptability
judgment: judgments that contrast word salad with obviously grammatical language (Ate
rat cat the vs. The cat ate the rat), judgments that test ‘obvious’ features of a grammar
such as adding -ed to form a past tense in English, and judgments that explore more sub-
tle features of a language like reference or long-distance dependency. Broadly, this three-
way categorization classifies judgments into ‘obvious’ (Marantz’s first two classes) and
‘nonobvious’ judgments (the third class). Marantz suggests that this third class of more
subtle judgments (what we call ‘nonobvious’) are the ones that could benefit from more
formal experimentation. Linzen and Oseki (2015) show that these intuitively nonobvious
judgments are much less likely to be replicated in a formal experiment, with rates of fail-
ures to replicate of 50% in Hebrew and 32% in Japanese for these nonobvious judgments
(where obviousness was coded by the experimenters).
But how does a researcher know a priori if she is dealing with a nonobvious judg-
ment? Five independent coders (KM, EG, and three others) annotated the 100 LI con-
trasts from our sample and classified them as obvious or nonobvious and found that the
average agreement between two coders was only 68%. Thus, it is not always obvious
when a contrast is obvious. The authors discussed the disagreements among the five
raters and arrived at a consensus set of obvious and nonobvious judgments, without
consulting the experimental data for these contrasts. Here, the contrasts that were rated
as ‘obvious’ had on average a mean of 92% in the forced-choice experiments, compared
to 79% for the nonobvious judgments. Significant results in the predicted direction
were shown for 98% of ‘obvious’ judgments in the forced-choice full experiment, com-
pared to just 86% for the ‘nonobvious’ judgments. Because judgments with over 90%
agreement in a full experiment were shown to be likely to pass SNAP judgments, the
SNAP judgments paradigm gives researchers an effective way to know if they are deal-
ing with a judgment that is in need of formal experimentation: judgments that do not
produce unanimous SNAP results are likely not ‘obvious’ contrasts. To that end, one
way of thinking of SNAP judgments is as an empirical procedure for determining
whether a syntactic contrast falls into the nonobvious class of judgments that warrant
further formal experimentation.
SNAP judgments will lead to more published quantitative data in two ways: (i)
through the publication of small-sample SNAP judgments data and (ii) through the in-
creased use of formal acceptability experiments for contrasts that do not meet the
SNAP threshold. Not only will the collection of more quantitative data help preclude er-
roneous analyses from entering the literature, but it will also enable us to continue
building a body of empirical data on acceptability judgments. This body of data will
make it easy for researchers to uncover new and interesting empirical phenomena and
to place those phenomena into a larger quantitative framework so as to understand gra-
dient effects and sources of variation in linguistic data. For instance, using the data from
this study (available for download from the Open Science Foundation at http://osf.io
/5wm2a), one can easily test a new contrast and plot it alongside the 100 phenomena
tested here in order to ask what other sentences the contrast patterns like, how much
variation there is among participants for that contrast, and how sensitive the contrast is
to variation in lexical items or context. Knowing whether a particular proposed effect is
small, medium, or large—and knowing exactly what that means relative to other pub-
lished judgments—is a worthwhile goal.
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Given the ease with which SNAP judgments can be attained, we believe that the time
and effort required is not much more than what a researcher already spends when dis-
cussing judgments with friends, colleagues, and students or what a field linguist spends
eliciting judgments from informants. By treating syntax and semantics questions empir-
ically, we can develop standardized quantitative methods that can be shared across dis-
ciplines, across languages, and by future generations of researchers.
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